These are some of my notes regarding the tragic Forrestal (CVA-59) fire 50 years ago this Saturday, on 29 July 1967.

Firefighting on board any ship, let alone a carrier with its fuel- and explosives-rich environment is always a matter of time. It simply has to be knocked down as quickly as possible.

In my second posting on the Forrestal fire I wrote of the old bombs and their thin shells and deteriorated explosives. The final report of the Navy’s investigation into the fire—Manual of the Judge Advocate General Basic Final Investigative Report Concerning the Fire on Board the USS FORRESTAL (CVA-59)—addressed these points and the affect they had on casualties.

The Zuni rocket struck the 400-gallon external fuel tank of an A-4E Skyhawk, rupturing the tank and spreading JP-5 fuel under two aircraft. The fuel was quickly ignited by “numerous fragments of burning rocket propellant.” (Finding #57 on page 34 [#57, p. 34]) In addition to splitting the tank, the Skyhawk’s two vintage bombs fell to the deck. One split open and began burning. Another fragment punctured the centerline 400-gallon tank on another A-4E further forward spreading additional burning fuel beneath the same two aircraft. [#61, p. 34]

The fuel fire alone would have been handled quickly and expeditiously. The report says the first firefighters were on the scene in literally seconds. The carrier, already launching the first aircraft for that mission, was turned into the wind and there was a steady 32-knot wind from fore-to-aft.

Shortly after the fire began, sailors begin to move toward the leading edge of the fire. The wind across the deck is obvious by the nearly flat smoke trail, and at this point the fire is concentrated on a relatively small and somewhat remote portion of the flight deck.

Finding #63, p. 34 of the report states: “That the burning fuel was then rapidly spread aft and fanned by 32 knots of wind over the deck from 350º relative and by the exhausts of at least three jets spotted immediately forward.”

The A-4 struck by the Zuni rocket, was only two aircraft from the stern on the port quarter. Raw and flaming fuel did not have far to travel to be washed overboard. Despite the quantity of fuel, the situation was not desperate. It was well within the capabilities of the men and equipment at the scene. Indeed, within 80 seconds of its initiation, “the first hose began to play salt water on the forward boundary of the fire.” [#4, no page] However, almost half a minute earlier, fifty-four seconds after the initiation of the fire, Chief Gerald W. Farrier, the head of the fire-fighting crew, arrived at the scene and immediately began battling the blaze around the cracked bomb with a hand-held fire extinguisher.

Plane handler Gary L. Shaver told me that, “There was a 1,000-pound bomb laying on the deck surrounded by burning fuel. I emptied the extinguisher to no avail. Several feet away from me was my flight deck Chief Farrier who also had an extinguisher and was applying it right on the bomb.

Suddenly there was an explosion. Chief Farrier disappeared.

I felt like I was going to come apart as the bomb’s concussion and shrapnel hit me. I was blown into the air, out of my shoes and helmet and struck by shrapnel in the left shoulder, stomach, arms, and head.”

The wild card on the deck was the ordnance, especially the old bombs. The initial impact set two of the thin-skinned 1,000-lb. M65A-1 bombs on the deck—surrounded by the fuel and raging fire. The first one detonated with its designed high-order explosion just 94 seconds after the fire began. [#74, p. 36] Just 9 seconds later a second bomb exploded. [#78, p. 36] All told, there were seven major explosions. [#80, p. 36] The total span lasted 5 minutes and 26 seconds. [Enclosure 35, attached]

This is enclosure 35, which gives the timing of each of the explosions.

When the first detonated, “approximately 35 personnel” were in proximity, “including two hose crews . . .” [#74, p. 36] This explosion “decimated the hose teams causing nine casualties to the ship’s crash and salvage crew, also eighteen casualties to other on-the-scene fire fighters.” [#75, p. 36] The second explosion “hurled bodies and debris as far as the bow” nearly 1,000 feet away. [#79, p. 36] “That effective fire fighting efforts on the flight deck were interupted” after this explosion “for approximately five minutes until the major explosions subsided.” [#81, p. 36]

With the second explosion, aircraft on the starboard (right) side of the deck became involved behind the island, shown here on the left. This greatly expanded the fire.

The charged lines were riddled by shrapnel. Fire fighting foam, so critical to dousing fuel fires, was lost, leaving only salt water. A fuel fire floats on water. All the water could do was cool the fire and wash it overboard. But there was a tragic problem. The major explosions punctured the inch-thick steel flight deck. Instead of flowing overboard into the sea, much of the burning fuel washed down inside the ship into what were primarily berthing areas. The majority of the ship’s crew who died, died in these spaces.

As a result of the fires and explostions, 134 sailors and airmen died and 161 were seriously wounded. Many more went unreported because their wounds were less severe. Of those who died, only 28 had been on the flight deck. Fifty died where they slept.

Further, the first two explosions had decimated the dedicated fire fighting crews, with the best knowledge and training to fight the fire. Well intentioned but inexperienced men stepped up to take their places.

In the wake of Forrestal every sailor undergoes mandatory firefighting training at the Farrier Firefighting School in Norfolk, Virginia. The lessons learned on Forrestal were not lost. Film of the fire figures prominently in every sailor’s training.