Category: Illustrations

USS Wampanoag

USS Wampanoag

When I took over Naval History‘s Historic Fleets column, one of the first things Editor-in-Chief Richard Latture did was change its title to Historic Ships, which is more in keeping with the piece’s focus.

For my very first column, I chose Wampanoag, a ship very few have heard of, but one that should be known as it was in all respects the progenitor of what later became known as battle cruisers.

This is the link to the column: https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2016/april/historic-ships-wampanoag-germ-idea-battlecruiser

As with so many of the early ships, especially those that have relegated to the back pages of history, documentation is thin. For this piece, I relied on Navy and Congressional reports. This from 1868 provided much information.

These line drawings are contemporary with the ship. Regrettably, my recording of sources at this time was deficient, so I cannot direct you to the source. It may have been from The Century magazine.
This drawing, most likely based on the above drawing was published by Proceedings in December 1937, page 1734. Note how compact (low) the engines and boilers are
Photographs of Wampanoag are rare and good ones are non-existent. This image of the ship at the New York Navy Yard, according to its source, the Naval History and Heritage Command, could be one of two things. The photo’s original mat has a date of 1874. In March 1874, the ship now renamed Florida, departed New York to become a receiving and store ship at New London Naval Station, Connecticut. This may show her after her refitting for that purpose. It is possible, however, than given her “new” condition appearance, this may have been taken in the winter of 1868, at the time of her trials. (NHHC NH 54159)

Perhaps the best extant photograph of the ship was most likely taken at the New York Navy Yard, c. 1869. (NHHC NH 76423)

This very poor image, also from the New York Navy Yard, probably in 1866, shows (from left) Wampanoag, fitting out; a screw gunboat of the Cayuga or Kansas class; Madawaska, preparing for trials; Susquehanna; Idaho, laid up after her unsuccessful trials (across the channel from Wampanoag): two “Double-Ender” sidewheel gunboats; and Vermont. (NHHC NH 85970)
This painting by J. C. Roach is entitled “An Incident of the Late War with Great Britain . . . USS Wampanoag Escaping from the Channel Fleet after Destroying the Halifax Convoy, July Fourth, 1866.” It depicts the ship performing her designed mission in an imaginary conflict. (NHHC NH 95699-KN)
An engraving of the ship show her under both sail and steam. (Source Unrecorded)
This very clean etching may have been based on photo NH 76423. (Source Unrecorded)
I’m Back: the Making Sausage Redux (1)

I’m Back: the Making Sausage Redux (1)

I haven’t posted in all of 2018. A lot has happened, but now that I have allegedly retired, I’m going to try to be more religious about posting.

Let’s see if we can do something with current projects.

Richard Latture, Editor-in-Chief of the U.S. Naval Institute‘s Naval History magazine, is working on a project to be printed in conjunction with the release of a new Tom Hanks movie, Greyhound, about destroyer combat in the North Atlantic during World War II. The film uses the destroyer Kidd (DD-661), which is on display in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, as part of the setting. Although Fletcher-class destroyers served almost exclusively in the Pacific, there are no extant examples of the Gleaves and Benson classes, which would be representative of the Atlantic destroyers.

Image result for USS kidd

Former USS Kidd (DD-661) in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

My assignment was to do a cutaway drawing of the Kidd. This is by far my most intense project. First thing is I knew it would not be 100 percent. That goes completely against the way I want to work, but it is a reality. That is simply a given when a deadline is staring you in the face along with little details such as time and money. The goal is to get the important parts right and live with representations or approximations for those that aren’t. Bottom line: it is not a photograph.

In starting a project, I collect as many base drawings as possible. This is, sadly, where the first compromises enter the project. Drawings simply do not match up. I have a fairly extensive collection of books to rely on for the initial search. I know which authors to trust and how much Kentucky windage needs to be used on other authors’ work. (One, whom shall not be named, has a great reputation for plans and models, but his plan view lines do not link with his profiles and sections. Where did he got that rep?) I check their sources, if  available, for additional information.

Less than a tenth of my collection.

I also have a decent collection of drawings that I’ve obtained from various sources primarily the National Archives and the Library of Congress. I was fortunate in this instance to trip over a collection of several hundred drawings on microfilm of the Fletcher-class. However, another caveat creeps in.

Fletchers were built at 11 different yards. And they were not identical. The plans I found were from the Bath Iron Works in Maine. Kidd was built by Federal Shipbuilding and Drydock Company in Kearny, New Jersey. I know the two sets of plans are not identical. I just don’t know what is different and where.

Even though I have these great drawings, they provide another three caveats.

1. Bath built at least three, and possibly four, different sets of Fletchers, known today as “flights.” There are detail differences between each. Assuming the same for Federal, which flight would match most closely to Kidd?

2. Even within these set of Bath drawings, the profiles, sections, and plan views do not match among flights for general outlines. I assume this is because of the microfilming process.

3. Many of the drawings needed to be combined; i.e., there were multiple frames of one drawing. Again, in linking these, there were dimensional differences and adjacent images would not be 100 percent in alignment.

The first three images need to be combined to form one complete drawing.

So, just in selecting whcih drawings tomwork from forces a number of decisions to be made, each of them getting the result farther from what is accurate.

Bottom line: I am not building a destroyer.

 

 

 

Save Our Photographic Heritage Part II

Save Our Photographic Heritage Part II

The colorization soapbox is completed.

Now, here is something that can be done with color that is not artificial.

I added nothing to this image.

All I did was change the values of what was in the original. I added no blues, deleted no magentas.

I, and I believe most others would agree, that the lower left version is closer to what the photographer wanted us to see than what is the “original” in the upper right.

Old color films and prints are not stable. They react to chemicals in the air (yes, what we breath is laden with all sorts of not good things) and light. Some colors react more than others. Over time the image color shifts. If you want to see some personal examples, go to your family’s photo archive (in my day it was a shoe box) and look at some Kodacolor, Ektacolor, Agfa, Ansco, Dupont, and others from the 1950s and 60s. You like magenta? You got magenta.

With good scanning—preferably of the original negatives or transparencies—and proper techniques using programs such as Photoshop, more than a few images can be restored to what they actually appeared on the original film or at least a much better approximation than what currently exists.

If more time was spent on images such as this rather than painting black and white photos, we would have a much more important historical record.

Oops. The soapbox popped up again. But that is my point.

Here are some other examples.

Sometimes surprises await. I never expected the vibrant colors in the print below from this original. I am in awe of the engraver’s art.

Even photographs that appear to be in good shape should be investigated, such as this one of USS Franklin (CV-13) on her return to New York after being seriously damaged in World War II. The original was a bit red-orange.Again, just adjusting values, gave this result.And more magenta images cleaned up . . .

Three VS-51 Douglas SBD-5 Dauntless in formation during work ups in Hawaii prior to deploying to Samoa in June 1944.  Naval History and Heritage Command  [80-G-K-1608]

 

USS Wasp (CV-7) taken probably at San Diego, Ca. Note the SB2Us and F4Fs on the flight deck. c June 1942.  Naval History and Heritage Command [80-G-K-447]
And sometimes an image goes green, but that can be cleaned up as well.

 


 

Save Our Photographic Heritage Part I

Save Our Photographic Heritage Part I

I am not a fan of colorized imagery.

If you want to call it “art” (with a little “a”) feel free. Teddy Turner fought that battle for a lot of years and lost.

It is an artifice.

Sure, it would be nice to see what those days looked like in “living” color. But anything that is added to those images is pure conjecture on the part of the “artist.”

I have the colors in my mind, and I am certain you have yours in yours.

 

 Take a look at these versions of a very famous photograph of Lt. (j.g.) Alex Vraciu signifying his six kills during the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot” on 19 June 1944. I downloaded the original from the Naval History and Heritage Command web site (https://www.history.navy.mil/our-collections/photography/numerical-list-of-images/nhhc-series/nh-series/80-G-236000/80-G-236841.html). The colorized version came from Pinterest. (https://www.pinterest.com/pin/322851867016047359/)

The colorized version got a fair number of “likes.” Fine. If you like this sort of thing. But there are two significant failings in that version. The first, upon which I will elaborate below, is the most significant reason for not doing this. The focus of the photograph—Vraciu’s toothy grin—is completely lost.

Lost? How can I say that? It is right there. Sure, but look at other values of brightness of equal or greater impact. Instead of focusing on the grin, the eye spreads around the image, giving equal or more weight to other, less significant areas. The “world is flat” theory.

The second is an obviously induced historical inaccuracy. This is something of which colorizers must be wary.

See that touch of red band of the insignia touching the chin of the central sailor? It is pretty inconspicuous, but telling. That red border (and it is missing from the rest of the insignia) was only authorized on U.S. military aircraft for basically six weeks in 1943, from 28 June through 14 August. While not all insignia were repainted immediately, thus appearing on aircraft for several months thereafter, this photograph was taken nearly a year later. This red should be blue.

Was that the only historical error the colorist introduced?

The bottom line is that colorization is very much akin to adding changes to passages in Moby Dick and republishing the novel without special notation. It is not what the author intended.

You might argue that the photographer, in real time, saw color and wanted to photograph that but could not because he did not have the proper film. That argument is invalid for a number of reasons. Color imaging material was available in World War I, indeed color photography first surfaced in 1855, within 20 years of the birth of the medium.

More to the point, however, is the purpose of the photography and the requirements of the job. Then, what were the limitations put on the photographer by “management?” For the Vraciu photograph, the photographer had color film available. Why did he chose black-and-white? This far removed we can only guess what the standard operating procedures were. My guess is two factors played into the choice: expediency and wide-spread distribution. The b&w process was quick and its results could be rapidly reproduced and disseminated. Color was problematic at all those points.

In the early 1970s, newspapers were just beginning to use color more frequently. The process had been developed years before and was widely used in magazines, but even there, only on a limited basis. It was an expensive process. A color page required four passes through the printing press—one for each color of cyan, magenta, yellow, and black. Each required its own printing plates and ink setup. Getting all four into alignment of 1/120th of an inch, meant there was a lot of wastage. Usually four-color images were only used in advertising, because the advertiser paid the cost. It wasn’t that way with news imagery. The paper bore the cost of that from its profits. Thus it was used sparingly.

But in the 70s, newspapers were competing with television news and the American viewership was beginning to see everything in “living compatible color.” (There is another whole story about that word “compatible.” We never knew how bad we had it.) So papers had to bite the bullet and compete.

Still, we photographers were limited by the assignment and/or page positioning. Page 1, Metro/City front pages, and sports front pages all got the color treatment. Stories relegated to the inside were condemned to black-and-white.

Over the course of nearly 40 years of newspaper photography, I have hundreds of thousands of black-and-white negatives in my files, and (pre-digital) significantly fewer than a tenth of that number in color.

My best photographs exist only in black-and-white. I do not wish to see any of them in color.

There are two very simple reasons, and they are interrelated. Black-and-white is a very objective medium. Color is not. People have predelections for colors. Humans react to color in very unpredictable manners. Some like blue, some don’t like green, some are ambivalent to yellow. Many hate red because of its resonance with blood. All this is subjective. Insert color into an image and you insert uncertainty. Among viewers there is no common predictable reaction to an image. This obscures the photographer’s communication.

Photographers have absolutely no control over the colors in an image, thus they cede a significant portion of their communication to the whims of the observer.

Black-and-white, however, has no similar baggage to overcome. The photographer, with his control over light and shadow, can get the viewer—all viewers—to the point of the image. We practiced this direction in the darkroom through the techniques of burning (adding more light) and dodging (removing light) from the printed image.

The human eye goes to light. A flash goes off, everyone turns to see the source. A light burns out, and unless it is the only one on in a room, no one notices.

In the darkroom, the photographer could and would de-emphasize certain portions of the image by burning, which had the effect of making that area darker. Conversely, he emphasized portions by dodging, making them lighter.

This pair of photos shows the not-so-subtle use of the “Hand of God.” The top is as published, the other has been deliberately darkened to emphasize how the photographer directed the viewer to the message—Rodney Marsh’s impish grin.

A skilled photographer—indeed the best in the world—crafted black-and-white images that could be read literally like a book. That is why they are the masters, even the most visually illiterate understand the point of the photograph.

The point here, especially as it relates to recent overload of colorized imagery particularly from World Wars I and II, is that by adding color the “artist” is adding subjectivity.

Realize that that color addition is just one person’s take on the actual colors; was it really that blue? something lighter? something darker? something a tad more green? yellow? red? mauve? puce? or a billion other colors, shades, intensities, brilliance, and more. And that is just one color in their addition to the photographer’s work.

What is lost is the photographer’s objective message.

Now don’t go splitting hairs on this. You will immediately observe that burning and dodging are subjective actions in their own. Aha! True! However, they are the photographer’s subjective insertions—the person who created the image. There is no subjectivity in that. The image as presented is what he wants you to see. It is his communication. Look at this, don’t look at that.

How can someone literally generations removed from a subject have the audacity to state this is what the photographer did or did not want you to see?


We Will Not Forget 6

We Will Not Forget 6

These are some of my notes regarding the tragic Forrestal (CVA-59) fire 50 years ago this Saturday, on 29 July 1967.

Firefighters check what remains of Whip’s A-4E Skyhawk after the fire was extiguished.

Lessons Learned

Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. George Santayana (1863–1952)

The Navy—and I am certain it is true for the other services as well—often dwell on “lessons learned.” How can the past be relevant? How can we make our history more relevant? More so than any other organizations, all too often the lessons learned by the military came at the great cost of blood and lives.

The Forrestal (CVA-59) fire of 50 years ago this Saturday, 29 July, literally affected the thousands of people on board ship that day. Many still bear the scars after a half century and often, they are invisible.

But not all scars are bad.

For one of the pilots on board the flight deck, then Lt. (j.g.) Richard M. “Whip” Wilson, whether or not even obvious to him he carried the lessons he learned that day on through his life. And many people may owe their lives to him and those lessons.

Whip is in the front row, fourth from left.

That 29 July, Whip, a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy Class of 1964, had just fired up the engine in his A-4E Skyhawk BuNo 152024, coded 310. He was assigned to VA-106, one of two light attack squadrons on board Forrestal. His aircraft was spotted just behind the jet blast deflector for the No. 3 catapult.

Right after the Zuni rocket fired, he saw his plane captain, “eyes as big as saucers,” frantically signalling him to shut down his engine. As he did so, off to his side he saw fuel on the deck. “I thought the [fuel] drop tank was over pressurized.” Then a bomb went off. Off to the right side of his aircraft, which was aft of the island by about two aircraft lengths, he saw bodies and debris.

As he dismounted his aircraft, he noticed that it wasn’t chocked—the wheels had no blocks to prevent the aircraft from rolling. By that time the fire was two stories high. He saw that the aircraft wasn’t moving, so he ran toward the island. About 30 seconds later his aircraft was on fire.

In talking about those day’s events today, he brought up the subject of lessons learned. He stated that those deaths, the fire, the trauma, did not need to happen. Procedures to prevent such an occurrence had, as noted in a previous blog post, not been followed.

Whether he consciously considered it or not, he can’t say, but in his post-Navy career in senior flying positions for Delta Airlines, acknowledgment and respect for procedures were in the top of his toolkit.

His resume is impressive. At Delta he was a line second officer on DC-8, Convair 880, and L-100, then second officer instructor on DC-8 and L-1011, then lead second officer instructor for both aircraft.  Later. a line first officer and captain on the DC-9, DC-9 and L-1011 pilot instructor, L-1011 captain and Fleet Manager. He retired flying the MD-11 as a captain flying mainly the Atlanta-Tokyo route plus Atlanta-Tokyo-New York-Tokyo-Atlanta.  He was at John F. Kennedy International Airport briefing for a JFK-Tokyo flight on 9/11.

When we spoke, it wasn’t about credentials and merits, it was about rules.

On one long-distance flight a warning light came on shortly after take-off. It was for a failure in a portion of the wing deicing system. Of itself, it was rather insignificant. The plane would not fall out of the sky, no one was in danger. But in the greater scheme of things, the deicing system is a protection against icing situations. The book said land and have it repaired unless no ice would be encountered. Flight Control and maintenance thought it okay to continue. Whip requested in writing verification that he would have a 6,000-mile ice-less trip or he would land the plane. He landed.

On another flight en route to Hawaii, he sensed a very slight bump when turning the aircraft. It was nothing of great concern. It just felt different. When it happened again, it got serious. He switched to manual control and could feel something was not right. He dumped fuel and landed the aircraft. While not of great worrisome magnitude there was enough of a “something isn’t right” sensation and repeatability that told him something indeed was wrong. It turned out to be a main landing gear door actuator that was letting the huge door move into the airstream. There is no telling what could have happened had the door opened wide enough to get some purchase on the airstream to rip it off. There was nothing in the rule book for this. But it was recognition, taking responsibility, and action in the face of an unknown. It could have been nothing. But deep down, Forrestal told him it could be something.

These were just two of the events that occurred over his long flying career. With the exception of the frustration of their flight delays, his many passengers were unaware that they owed their safety to the men of Forrestal.

We Will Not Forget 5

We Will Not Forget 5

These are some of my notes regarding the tragic Forrestal (CVA-59) fire 50 years ago this Saturday, on 29 July 1967.

http://smragan.com/2011/04/ Profile view of can you buy prednisone in spain Forrestal with profiles of all the types of aircraft and representative squadrons on 29 July 1967.

In all my research about the fire, I had not seen a correlation between the PLAT film and the aircraft as they were spotted at the time.

Based on drawings in the Navy’s official Manual of the Judge Advocate General Basic Final Investigative Report Concerning the Fire on Board the USS FORRESTAL (CVA-59), which is the Navy’s definitive statement on the topic, I redrew the flight deck to scale and spotted the aircraft per the official drawings.

I then roughly plotted the plat camera angle based on the photograph and identified the aircraft in both the plan and the PLAT. There are some minor discrepancies, especially at the far left. This is because the flight deck was extremely dynamic. Not just because of the fire, but because of preparations for the Alpha Strike and normal movement of aircraft.

But for the A-4s across the fan tail from 410 to 303, and up the port quarter from 414 through 316, it is as accurate as I can make it.

 

Deck with aircraft as spotted at the time of the fire according to the official report. The PLAT film image is correlated with the diagram. 405 is the aircraft struck by Zuni, piloted by LtCdr. Fred White. 

Below is a drawing of the plane spots as presented in Naval Aviation News in October 1967, just three months after the fire.

We Will Not Forget 4

We Will Not Forget 4

These are some of my notes regarding the tragic Forrestal (CVA-59) fire 50 years ago this Saturday, on 29 July 1967.

Firefighting on board any ship, let alone a carrier with its fuel- and explosives-rich environment is always a matter of time. It simply has to be knocked down as quickly as possible.

In my second posting on the Forrestal fire I wrote of the old bombs and their thin shells and deteriorated explosives. The final report of the Navy’s investigation into the fire—Manual of the Judge Advocate General Basic Final Investigative Report Concerning the Fire on Board the USS FORRESTAL (CVA-59)—addressed these points and the affect they had on casualties.

The Zuni rocket struck the 400-gallon external fuel tank of an A-4E Skyhawk, rupturing the tank and spreading JP-5 fuel under two aircraft. The fuel was quickly ignited by “numerous fragments of burning rocket propellant.” (Finding #57 on page 34 [#57, p. 34]) In addition to splitting the tank, the Skyhawk’s two vintage bombs fell to the deck. One split open and began burning. Another fragment punctured the centerline 400-gallon tank on another A-4E further forward spreading additional burning fuel beneath the same two aircraft. [#61, p. 34]

The fuel fire alone would have been handled quickly and expeditiously. The report says the first firefighters were on the scene in literally seconds. The carrier, already launching the first aircraft for that mission, was turned into the wind and there was a steady 32-knot wind from fore-to-aft.

Shortly after the fire began, sailors begin to move toward the leading edge of the fire. The wind across the deck is obvious by the nearly flat smoke trail, and at this point the fire is concentrated on a relatively small and somewhat remote portion of the flight deck.

Finding #63, p. 34 of the report states: “That the burning fuel was then rapidly spread aft and fanned by 32 knots of wind over the deck from 350º relative and by the exhausts of at least three jets spotted immediately forward.”

The A-4 struck by the Zuni rocket, was only two aircraft from the stern on the port quarter. Raw and flaming fuel did not have far to travel to be washed overboard. Despite the quantity of fuel, the situation was not desperate. It was well within the capabilities of the men and equipment at the scene. Indeed, within 80 seconds of its initiation, “the first hose began to play salt water on the forward boundary of the fire.” [#4, no page] However, almost half a minute earlier, fifty-four seconds after the initiation of the fire, Chief Gerald W. Farrier, the head of the fire-fighting crew, arrived at the scene and immediately began battling the blaze around the cracked bomb with a hand-held fire extinguisher.

Plane handler Gary L. Shaver told me that, “There was a 1,000-pound bomb laying on the deck surrounded by burning fuel. I emptied the extinguisher to no avail. Several feet away from me was my flight deck Chief Farrier who also had an extinguisher and was applying it right on the bomb.

Suddenly there was an explosion. Chief Farrier disappeared.

I felt like I was going to come apart as the bomb’s concussion and shrapnel hit me. I was blown into the air, out of my shoes and helmet and struck by shrapnel in the left shoulder, stomach, arms, and head.”

The wild card on the deck was the ordnance, especially the old bombs. The initial impact set two of the thin-skinned 1,000-lb. M65A-1 bombs on the deck—surrounded by the fuel and raging fire. The first one detonated with its designed high-order explosion just 94 seconds after the fire began. [#74, p. 36] Just 9 seconds later a second bomb exploded. [#78, p. 36] All told, there were seven major explosions. [#80, p. 36] The total span lasted 5 minutes and 26 seconds. [Enclosure 35, attached]

This is enclosure 35, which gives the timing of each of the explosions.

When the first detonated, “approximately 35 personnel” were in proximity, “including two hose crews . . .” [#74, p. 36] This explosion “decimated the hose teams causing nine casualties to the ship’s crash and salvage crew, also eighteen casualties to other on-the-scene fire fighters.” [#75, p. 36] The second explosion “hurled bodies and debris as far as the bow” nearly 1,000 feet away. [#79, p. 36] “That effective fire fighting efforts on the flight deck were interupted” after this explosion “for approximately five minutes until the major explosions subsided.” [#81, p. 36]

With the second explosion, aircraft on the starboard (right) side of the deck became involved behind the island, shown here on the left. This greatly expanded the fire.

The charged lines were riddled by shrapnel. Fire fighting foam, so critical to dousing fuel fires, was lost, leaving only salt water. A fuel fire floats on water. All the water could do was cool the fire and wash it overboard. But there was a tragic problem. The major explosions punctured the inch-thick steel flight deck. Instead of flowing overboard into the sea, much of the burning fuel washed down inside the ship into what were primarily berthing areas. The majority of the ship’s crew who died, died in these spaces.

As a result of the fires and explostions, 134 sailors and airmen died and 161 were seriously wounded. Many more went unreported because their wounds were less severe. Of those who died, only 28 had been on the flight deck. Fifty died where they slept.

Further, the first two explosions had decimated the dedicated fire fighting crews, with the best knowledge and training to fight the fire. Well intentioned but inexperienced men stepped up to take their places.

In the wake of Forrestal every sailor undergoes mandatory firefighting training at the Farrier Firefighting School in Norfolk, Virginia. The lessons learned on Forrestal were not lost. Film of the fire figures prominently in every sailor’s training.

We Will Not Forget 3

We Will Not Forget 3

These are some of my notes regarding the tragic Forrestal (CVA-59) fire 50 years ago this Saturday, on 29 July 1967.

A stray electrical charge caused the inadvertant launch of a 5-inch Zuni rocket from this Phantom II.

The seminal document is the Navy’s own Manual of the Judge Advocate General Basic Final Investigative Report Concerning the Fire on Board the USS FORRESTAL (CVA-59). This 6,000+ page report is the Navy’s official conclusion for what happened that fateful day.

The proximate cause of the fire was a briefest of brief spike in electrical energy that triggered the launching of a 5-inch FFAR (folding-fin aircraft rocket), known as a Zuni, from an F-4B Phantom II.

 

The LAU-10 pod carried four Zuni rockets, often beneath a frangible nose cone that would break apart with the launching of the first rocket.

The investigation board focused on the Zuni rocket and its LAU-10 launching pod. Those aboard that day generally agreed that the rocket started the fire, but that it was confinable, fightable, that they had a chance until that first bomb went off.

The final report found that there were shortcomings in the Zuni launching pod. Attachment cords between the pod and its TER (triple ejector rack) mounting on the aircraft called “pigtails” carried the electrical firing charge from the pilot’s finger on the button to the rocket’s igniter. Pins on the pigtail could be bent causing a short circuit.

 

The LAU-10 was mounted on one of three positions on the Triple Ejector Rack or TER. The TER was electrically connected to the F-4B. The pigtail (circled) electrically connected the LAU-10 and TER.

Further, there were two separate safety procedures to prevent an inadvertent firing of the Zuni. One was that the pigtails were not to be plugged in until immediately before the aircraft’s launching. With the high-tempo of flight deck operations, the delayed connection of pigtails slowed down launches such that they caused conflicts with the launching of one mission and the recovery of a previous mission.

The veterans of the experienced Pacific-based carriers passed this information to the newly arrived Forrestal squadrons. (Forrestal was the first Atlantic carrier to take up station off Yankee Station, thus it had little basis for “lessons learned” in the high tempo ops off Vietnam.) Their ship’s safety committee chose to bypass this safety procedure because there was another significant device, which was highly effective.

Four LAU-10s are mounted on this Marine Corps F-4B.

That device, essentially a safety pin, mechanically and electrically prevented a rocket’s launch. Standard procedure was for that pin to be pulled only immediately before launch.

However, in some instances, again in the interest of getting the aircraft off the deck as soon as possible, crews began pulling pins before the aircraft got to the catapult.

The Navy report determined that the rocket fired when the pilot of the F-4B carrying the Zuni switched power sources.

The Phantoms required an external power source to start their engines. Once one of the engines in the twin-engined fighter was at a certain power level after being started by a “huffer,” the pilot would switch from the external source to the internal source powered by the running engine. When the pilot switched power sources there was a brief spike of electrical energy.

Of itself, that spike would not have launched a Zuni. However, with the pigtail connected, the electricity had a route to the rocket. With the safety pin pulled, the Zuni was electrically and mechanically free to be fired.

Although the report cited the errors of safety checks on the rocket, it found no one aboard the ship directly responsible for the fire and subsequent explosions.

 

 

 

We Will Not Forget 2

We Will Not Forget 2

These are some of my notes regarding the tragic Forrestal (CVA-59) fire 50 years ago this Saturday, on 29 July 1967.

The fire and aftermath of one of the “high order” explosions was captured by now-retired Rear Admiral Peter B. Booth.

While not the instigators of the fire, the vehicles of so much death and destruction were the Korean War–vintage AN/M65A1 1000-lb. bombs. These were deadly on two accounts.

They had thin-shelled casings, basically thin tubes of steel with rounded nose and truncated conical aft body. As mounted on the A-4 Skyhawks of VA-46 and VA-126, they mounted a “conical fin assembly” for better streamlining, in lieu of the readily recognizable open box fins of World War II.

A crewman provided this image of the M65s on the day of the fire. I apologize for not being able to credit him.

They were quite unlike the “modern” bombs of the time, the very streamlined MK 80 series of the MK 81 250-, MK 82 500-, MK 83 1000-, and MK84 2000-lb bombs, which were thick-walled and covered with a coarse ablative surface. Somewhere in my notes I have comparative “cook off” times between the two types of bombs; i.e. how quickly they would explode if engulfed in a fire. I don’t want to quote numbers without looking at the notes, but I do recall the comparative figures. The MK 80s could survive in a fire more than three times as long as the M65s. This means that firefighters would have at least three times longer to knock down the fire. Further, the majority of MK 80s, which cooked off did so with a “low order” explosion. The M65s all went in “high order.” Basically this was the difference between a big pop and really big explosion.

MK 83 1000-lb general purpose bombs.

The other aspect is the explosives they contained. The AN/M65s, constructed in 1953, were loaded with “Comp B” explosive. Unlike modern explosives, “Comp B” became unstable with age and hot, humid storage conditions. At the least these weapons were 14 years old and had been stored in the open in the hot, humid climate of Okinawa.

A plane handler, William Boote, told me: “I remember to this day the feeling I had as I touched one of the 1000-pound bombs and commented to (co-handlers) that I didn’t ‘like the looks of these bombs, and that something bad was going to happen.’”

There were 80 bombs aboard 15 attack aircraft totalling 24 1/2-tons of high explosives for the 11:00 a.m. mission. Eight tons consisted of 16 old 1,000-pound bombs. The seven which exploded did so in a catastrophic “high order” fashion, as they were designed to do against an enemy. The nine others were listed as missing or jettisoned.

This is my dozen-year old crude attempt to depict the bombs as mounted on the aircraft. I have been unable to find any with decent detail that shows the conical fin assembly. The first drawing is based on Navy technical drawings I obtained. The second is from a very small undetailed photograph. The third shows it in its Korean War form. I would gladly appreciate any information that can help me correct this drawing.

Help

Help

This is a plea for information.

I am working on a book with Bob Sumrall and this photograph is one we intend to use. There is, however, no caption information.

Can someone positively identify the ship, location, date, situation?

I appreciate surmises, but I can do that myself.

I see Hornet (CV-8).  (Because of the lighting and shrouding steam my gut reaction was a short-hull Essex (CV-9) in splinter camouflage, but a number of points dissuade me. First was the lack of 5-inch gunhouses. Next, the two-level open foretop. Essex had no foretop, just platforms. Yorktown (CV-5) and Enterprise (CV-6) both had larger enclosed foretops. Then there is the boat crane aft and lack of port-side elevator. The camouflage is a trick of the low early morning lighting and shadows.)

A chilly early morning. Possibly Brooklyn Navy Yard. But I have no proof on any of these including the ship’s identity.

The only “factual” item I have is a number: K6556. I have checked as many variations of the NH and 80-G series numbers as I can think to search—including adding possible missing numbers (probably more than a couple hundred in total)—with no luck.

If you can help, please point me to your information source.

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